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Abstract. Over the years complexity theorists have proposed many
structural parameters to explain the surprising efficiency of conflict-
driven clause-learning (CDCL) SAT solvers on a wide variety of large
industrial Boolean instances. While some of these parameters have been
studied empirically, until now there has not been a unified comparative
study of their explanatory power on a comprehensive benchmark. We
correct this state of affairs by conducting a large-scale empirical evalu-
ation of CDCL SAT solver performance on nearly 7000 industrial and
crafted formulas against several structural parameters such as backdoors,
treewidth, backbones, and community structure.
Our study led us to several results. First, we show that while such pa-
rameters only weakly correlate with CDCL solving time, certain combi-
nations of them yield much better regression models. Second, we show
how some parameters can be used as a “lens” to better understand
the efficiency of different solving heuristics. Finally, we propose a new
complexity-theoretic parameter, which we call learning-sensitive with
restarts (LSR) backdoors, that extends the notion of learning-sensitive
(LS) backdoors to incorporate restarts and discuss algorithms to compute
them. We mathematically prove that for certain class of instances min-
imal LSR-backdoors are exponentially smaller than minimal-LS back-
doors.
1 Introduction
Modern conflict-driven clause-learning (CDCL) satisfiability (SAT) solvers rou-
tinely solve real-world Boolean instances with millions of variables and clauses,
despite the Boolean satisfiability problem being NP-complete and widely re-
garded as intractable in general. This has perplexed both theoreticians and solver
developers alike over the last two decades. A commonly proposed explanation is
that these solvers somehow exploit the underlying structure inherent in industrial
instances. Previous work has attempted to identify a variety of structural pa-
rameters, such as backdoors [37,36,13], community structure modularity [4,28],
and treewidth [25]. Additionally, researchers have undertaken limited studies to
correlate the size/quality measures of these parameters with CDCL SAT solver
runtime. For example, Newsham et al. [28] showed that there is moderate cor-
relation between the runtime of CDCL SAT solvers and modularity of commu-
nity structure of industrial instances. Others have shown that certain classes of
crafted and industrial instances often have favorable parameter values, such as
small backdoor sizes [13,19,20,37].
There are several reason for trying to understand why SAT solvers work as
well as they do on industrial instances, and what, if any, structure they exploit.
First and foremost is the scientific motivation: a common refrain about heuristics
in computer science is that we rarely fully understand why and under what
circumstances they work well. Second, a deeper understanding of the relationship
between the power of SAT heuristics and the structure of instances over which
they work well can lead us to develop better SAT solvers. Finally, we hope that
this work will eventually lead to new parameterized complexity results relevant
to classes of industrial instances.
Before we get into the details of our empirical study, we briefly discuss several
principles that guided us in this work: first, we wanted our study to be compre-
hensive both in terms of the parameters as well as the large size and variety of
benchmarks considered. This approach enabled us to compare the explanatory
strengths of different parameters in a way that previous studies could not. Also,
the large scale and variety of benchmarks allowed us to draw more general con-
clusions than otherwise. Second, we were clear from the outset that we would
be agnostic to the type of correlations (strong or moderate, positive or negative)
obtained, as poor correlations are crucial in ruling out parameters that are not
explanatory. Third, parameter values should enable us to distinguish between
industrial and crafted instances.
Although many studies of these parameters have been performed in isolation,
a comprehensive comparison has not been performed between them. A primary
reason for this is that most of these parameters are difficult to compute – often
NP-hard – and many take longer to compute than solving the original formula.
Further, certain parameters such as weak backdoor size are only applicable to
satisfiable instances [37]. Hence, such parameters have often been evaluated on
incomparable benchmark sets, making a proper comparison between them diffi-
cult. We correct this issue in our study by focusing on instances found in previous
SAT competitions, specifically from the Application, Crafted, and Agile tracks
[2]. These instances are used to evaluate state-of-the-art SAT solvers on a yearly
basis. Application instances are derived from a wide variety of sources and can
be considered a small sample of the types of SAT instances found in practice,
such as from verification domains. Crafted instances mostly contain encodings
of combinatorial/mathematical properties, such as the pigeon-hole principle or
pebbling formulas. While many of these instances are much smaller than indus-
trial instances, they are often very hard for CDCL solvers. The Agile track eval-
uates solvers on bit-blasted quantifier-free bit-vector instances generated from
the whitebox fuzz tester SAGE [16]. In total, we consider approximately 1200
application instances, 800 crafted instances, and 5000 Agile instances.
Contributions. We make the following four key contributions in this paper:
1. We perform a large scale evaluation of several structural parameters on ap-
proximately 7000 SAT instances obtained from a wide variety of benchmark
suites, and relate them to CDCL solver performance. We show moderate cor-
relations to solving time for certain combinations of features, and very high
correlations for the Agile benchmark. We further show that application and
Agile instances have significantly better structural parameter values com-
pared to crafted instances. To the best of our knowledge, this is first such
comprehensive study. (Refer Section 4)
2. We introduce a new structural parameter, which we call learning-sensitive
with restarts (LSR) backdoors, and describe a novel algorithm for computing
upper bounds on minimum LSR-backdoor sizes, using the concept of clause
absorption from [6]. The LSR-backdoor concept naturally extends the idea of
learning-sensitive (LS) backdoors introduced by Dilkina et al. [12] by taking
into account restarts, a key feature of CDCL SAT solvers. (Refer Background
Section 2 and Section 5)
3. We show how these structural parameters can be used as a lens to compare
various solving heuristics, with a current focus on restart policies. For exam-
ple, we show that the “Always Restart” policy not only produces the smallest
backdoors (with respect to the algorithm we use from Section 5), but also
has the fastest runtime for a class of instances. We hope that our work can
be used as a guide by theorists and SAT solver developers to rule out the
study of certain types of parameters (and rule in new types of parameters)
for understanding the efficiency of CDCL SAT solvers. (Refer Section 4)
4. We mathematically prove that minimal LSR-backdoors can be exponentially
smaller than LS-backdoors for certain formulas. (Refer Section 6)
2 Background
CDCL SAT Solvers. We assume basic familiarity with the satisfiability prob-
lem, CDCL solvers and the standard notation used by solver developers and
complexity theorists. For an overview we refer to [8]. We assume that Boolean
formulas are given in conjunctive normal form (CNF). For a formula F , we de-
note its variables as vars(F). A model refers to a complete satisfying assignment
to a formula. The trail refers to the sequence of variable assignments, in the order
they have been assigned, at any given point in time during the run of a solver.
Learnt clauses are derived by analyzing the conflict analysis graph (CAG), which
represents which decisions and propagations that led to a conflict. We assume
the first unique implication point (1st-UIP) clause learning scheme throughout
this paper, which is the most common in practice [27]. The learnt clause (aka
conflict clause) defines a cut in the CAG; we denote the subgraph on the side of
the cut which contains the conflict node as the conflict side, and the other side
as the reason side. For a set of clauses ∆ and a literal l, ∆ ⊢1 l denotes that unit
propagation can derive l from ∆.
Backdoors and Backbones. Backdoors are defined with respect to sub-
solvers, which are algorithms that can solve certain class of SAT instances in
polynomial-time. Example subsolvers include the unit propagation (UP) algo-
rithm [13,37], which is also what we focus on as it is a standard subroutine
implemented in CDCL SAT solvers. Given a partial assignment α : B → {0, 1},
the simplification of F with respect to α, denoted F [α], removes all clauses that
are satisfied by α, and removes any literals that are falsified by α in the re-
maining clauses. A strong backdoor of a formula F is a set of variables B such
that for every assignment α to B, F [α] can be determined to be satisfiable or
unsatisfiable by the UP subsolver [37]. A set of variables B is a weak backdoor
with respect to a subsolver S if there exists an assignment α to B such that the
UP subsolver determines the formula to be satisfiable. Backdoors were further
extended to allow clause-learning to occur while exploring the search space of
the backdoor:
Definition 1 (Learning-sensitive (LS) backdoor [11]). A set of variables
B ⊆ vars(F ) is an LS-backdoor of a formula F with respect to a subsolver S if
there exists a search-tree exploration order such that a CDCL SAT solver without
restarts, branching only on B and learning clauses at the leaves of the tree with
subsolver S, either finds a model for F or proves that F is unsatisfiable.
The backbone of a SAT instance is the maximal set of variables such that all
variables in the set have the same polarity in every model [26]. Note that weak
backdoors and backbones are typically only defined over satisfiable instances.
Further, while the backbone of an instance is unique, many backdoors may exist;
we typically try to find the smallest backdoors possible.
Learning-sensitive with Restarts (LSR) Backdoors. We introduce the
concept of an LSR-backdoor here. Section 5 formalizes our approach.
Definition 2 (Learning-sensitive with restarts (LSR) backdoor). A set
of variables B ⊆ vars(F ) is an LSR-backdoor of the formula F with respect to
a subsolver S if there exists a search-tree exploration order such that a CDCL
SAT solver (with restarts), branching only on B and learning clauses at the
leaves of the tree with subsolver S, either finds a model for F or proves that F
is unsatisfiable.
By allowing restarts, the solver may learn clauses from different parts of the
search-tree of B, which would otherwise not be accessible without restarts. In
Section 5, we demonstrate an approach to computing upper bounds on mini-
mal LSR-backdoor sizes using algorithms for clause absorption from [6], which
intrinsically relies upon restarts.
Graph Parameters.We refer to treewidth [33] and community structure [4]
as graph parameters. All graphs parameters are computed over the variable in-
cidence graph (VIG) of a CNF formula F [4]. There exists a vertex for every
variable in F , and edges between vertices if their corresponding variables appear
in clauses together (weighted according to clause size). Intuitively, the commu-
nity structure of a graph is a partition of the vertices into communities such
that there are more intra-community edges than inter-community edges. The
modularity or Q value intuitively denotes how easily separable the communities
of the graph are. The Q value ranges from [−1/2, 1), where values near 1 means
the communities are highly separable and the graph intuitively has a better com-
munity structure. Treewidth intuitively measures how much a graph resembles a
tree. Actual trees have treewidth 1. Further details can be found in [33].
3 Related Work
Backdoor-related Parameters. Traditional weak and strong backdoors for
both SAT and CSP were introduced by Williams et al. [37]. Kilby et al. intro-
duced a local search algorithm for computing weak backdoors [19], and showed
that random SAT instances have medium sized backdoors (of roughly 50% of
the variables), and that the size of weak backdoors did not correlate strongly
with solving time. Li et al. introduced an improved Tabu local search heuristic
for weak backdoors [20]. They demonstrated that many industrial satisfiable in-
stances from SAT competitions have very small weak backdoors, often around
1% of the variables. The size of backdoors with respect to subsolvers different
from UP was considered in [13,20]. Monasson et al. introduced backbones to
study random 3-SAT instances [26]. Janota et al. [17] introduced and empiri-
cally evaluated several algorithms for computing backbones. Several extensions
of traditional strong and weak backdoors have been proposed. Learning-sensitive
(LS) backdoors also consider the assignment tree of backdoor variables, but ad-
ditionally allow clause learning to occur while traversing the tree, which may
yield exponentially smaller backdoors than strong backdoors [11,12].
Graph Abstraction Parameters. Mateescu computed lower and upper
bounds on the treewidth of large application formulas [25]. Anso´tegui et al. in-
troduced community structure abstractions of SAT formulas, and demonstrated
that industrial instances tend to have much better structure than other classes,
such as random [4]. It has also been shown that community-based features are
useful for classifying industrial instances into subclasses (which distinguish types
of industrial instances in the SAT competition) [18]. Community-based param-
eters have also recently been shown to be one of the best predictors for SAT
solving performance [28].
Other work such as SatZilla [39] focus on large sets of easy-to-compute
parameters that can be used to quickly predict the runtime of SAT solvers.
In this paper, our focus is on parameters that, if sufficiently favorable, offer
provable parameterized complexity-theoretic guarantees of worst-case runtime
[14]. The study of structural parameters of SAT instances was inspired by the
work on clause-variable ratio and the phase transition phenomenon observed for
randomly-generated SAT instances in the late 1990’s [10,26,34].
Table 1 lists previous results on empirically computing several parameters
and correlating them with SAT solving time. While weak backdoors, backbones,
and treewidth have been evaluated on some industrial instances from the SAT
competitions, only modularity has been evaluated across a wide range of in-
Type Benchmarks Unsat? Tool Description
Weak [19,20,38]
3SAT, GC,
SR
No
Perform Tabu-based local search to mini-
mize the number of decisions in the final
model.
LS [12,13] LP Yes
Run a clause-learning solver, recording all
decisions, which constitutes a backdoor.
Backbones [17,19,38]
3SAT, GC,
Comps
No
Repeated SAT calls with UNSAT-core
based optimizations.
Treewidth [21,25] C09, FM Yes
Heuristically compute residual graph G.
The max-clique of G is an upper-bound.
Modularity [4,28] Comps Yes
The Louvain method [9] – greedily join com-
munities to improve modularity.
Table 1. Previously studied benchmarks for each considered parameter, as well as
description of tools used to compute them. The “Unsat?” column indicates if the pa-
rameter is defined on unsatisfiable instances. Abbrevations: 3SAT – random 3-SAT; GC
– graph coloring; LP – logistics planning; SR – SAT Race 2008; C09 – SAT competition
2009; Comps – 2009-2014 SAT competitions; FM – feature models.
Benchmark Instances LSR Weak Cmty Bones TW
Application 1238 420 306 984 218 1181
Crafted 753 327 195 613 154 753
Random 126 123 76 126 59 126
Agile 4968 2828 464 4968 208 4968
Total 7085 3698 1041 6691 639 7028
Table 2. The number of instances for which we were able to successfully compute each
parameter. “Cmty” refers to the community parameters; “TW” denotes the treewidth
upper bound; “Bones” denotes backbone size.
Feature Set Application Crafted Random Agile
V ⊕ C ⊕ C/V 0.03 (1237) 0.04 (753) 0.04 (126) 0.84 (4968)
V ⊕ C ⊕ Cmtys⊕Q 0.06 (982) 0.22 (613) 0.17 (126) 0.86 (4968)
V ⊕ C ⊕ LSR ⊕ LSR/V 0.14 (420) 0.26 (327) 0.26 (123) 0.87 (2828)
V ⊕ C ⊕#Min Weak ⊕Weak 0.04 (299) 0.11 (195) 0.08 (76) 0.54 (464)
V ⊕ C ⊕Bones⊕Bones/V 0.18 (218) 0.39 (154) 0.04 (59) 0.39 (208)
V ⊕ C ⊕ TW ⊕ TW/V 0.05 (1180) 0.07 (753) 0.11 (126) 0.91 (4968)
Q⊕ C/V ⊕ LSR/V ⊕Q/Cmtys⊕ C 0.29 (420) 0.34 (327) 0.13 (123) 0.90 (2828)
TW/V ⊕Q⊕ Cmtys⊕ TW ⊕ LSR/V 0.12 (420) 0.57 (327) 0.08 (123) 0.92 (2828)
Q/Cmtys⊕ LSR/V ⊕C ⊕ LSR ⊕Q 0.22 (420) 0.35 (327) 0.45 (123) 0.89 (2828)
Cmtys⊕ TW/V ⊕C/V ⊕ TW ⊕Q 0.18 (420) 0.29 (327) 0.04 (123) 0.93 (2828)
Table 3. Adjusted R2 values for the given features, compared to log of MapleCOMSPS’
solving time. The number in parentheses indicates the number of instances that were
considered in each case. The lower section considers heterogeneous sets of features
across different parameter types.
Benchmark LSR/V Weak/V Q Bones/V TW/V
Agile 0.18 (0.13) 0.01 (0.01) 0.82 (0.07) 0.17 (0.11) 0.16 (0.08)
Application 0.35 (0.34) 0.03 (0.05) 0.75 (0.19) 0.64 (0.38) 0.32 (0.22)
Crafted 0.58 (0.35) 0.08 (0.11) 0.58 (0.24) 0.39 (0.41) 0.44 (0.29)
Random 0.64 (0.32) 0.11 (0.10) 0.14 (0.10) 0.47 (0.40) 0.82 (0.12)
Table 4. Mean (std. dev.) of several parameter values.
stances. Some benchmarks, such as the random 3-SAT and graph coloring in-
stances considered in [19], are too small/easy for modern day CDCL solvers
to perform meaningful analysis. Additionally, the benchmarks used in previous
works to evaluate each parameter are mostly disjoint, making comparisons across
the data difficult.
4 Analysis of Structural SAT Parameters
Our first set of experiments investigate the relationship between structural pa-
rameters and CDCL performance. While we would like to evaluate all parame-
ters considered in Section 3, we focus on weak backdoors, backbones, community
structure, treewidth, and LSR-backdoors. We note that obtaining any non-trivial
upper bound on the size of the strong backdoor seems infeasible at this time.
Experimental Setup, Tools, and Benchmarks.We use off the shelf tools
to compute weak backdoors [20], community structure and modularity [28], back-
bones [17], and treewidth [25]. Their approaches are briefly described in Table 1.
Due to the difficulty of exactly computing these parameters, with the exception
of backbones, the algorithms used in previous work (and our experiments) do
not find optimal solutions, e.g., the output may be an upper-bound on the size
of the minimum backdoor. We compute LSR-backdoors using a tool we devel-
oped called LaSeR, which computes an upper-bound on the size of the minimal
LSR-backdoor. The tool is built on top of the MapleSat SAT solver [22], an ex-
tension of MiniSat [15]. We describe the LaSeR algorithm in Section 5. We use
MapleCOMSPS, the 2016 SAT competition main track winner as our reference
solver for solver runtime.
Table 2 shows the data sources for our experiments. We include all instances
from the Application and Crafted tracks of the SAT competitions from 2009 to
2014, as well as the 2016 Agile track. We additionally included a small set of
random instances as a baseline. As the random instances from recent SAT com-
petitions are too difficult for CDCL solvers, we include a set of instances from
older competitions. We pre-selected all random instances from the 2007 and 2009
SAT competitions that could be solved in under 5 minutes by MapleCOMSPS.
All instances were simplified using MapleCOMSPS’ preprocessor before comput-
ing the parameters. The preprocessing time was not included in solving time.
Experiments were run on an Azure cluster, where each node contained two
3.1 GHz processors and 14 GB of RAM. Each experiment was limited to 6 GB.
For the Application, Crafted, and Random instances, we allotted 5000 seconds
for MapleCOMSPS solving (the same as used in the SAT competition), 24 hours
for backbone and weak backdoor computation, 2 hours for community structure
computation, and 3 hours for LSR computation. For the Agile instances, we
allowed 60 seconds for MapleCOMSPS solving and 300 seconds for LSR com-
putation; the remaining Agile parameter computations had the same cutoff as
Application. Due to the difficulty of computing these parameters, we do not
obtain values for all instances due to time or memory limits being exceeded.
Several longer running experiments were run on the SHARCNET Orca cluster
[3]. Nodes contain cores between 2.2GHz and 2.7GHz.
Structural Parameters and Solver Runtime Correlation: The first
research question we posed is the following: Do parameter values correlate with
solving time? In particular, can we build significantly stronger regression models
by incorporating combinations of these features? To address this, we construct
ridge regression models from subsets of features related to these parameters.
We used ridge regression, as opposed to linear regression, in order to penalize
multi-collinear features in the data. We consider the following “base” features:
number of variables (V), number of clauses (C), number of communities (Cm-
tys), modularity (Q), weak backdoor size (Weak), the number of minimal weak
backdoors computed (#Min Weak), LSR-backdoor size (LSR), treewidth upper-
bound (TW), and backbone size (Bones). For each P ∈ {C, Cmtys, Weak, LSR,
TW, Bones} we include its ratio with respect to V as P/V . We also include the
ratio feature Q/Cmtys, as used in [28]. All features are normalized to have mean
0 and standard deviation 1. For a given subset of these features under consid-
eration, we use the “⊕” symbol to indicate that our regression model contains
these base features, as well as all higher-order combinations of them (combined
by multiplication). For example, V ⊕C contains four features: V , C, and V ·C,
plus one “intercept” feature. Our dependent variable is the log of runtime of the
MapleCOMSPS solver.
In Table 3, we first consider sets of homogeneous features with respect to a
given parameter, e.g., only weak backdoor features, or only community structure
based features, along with V and C as baseline features. Each cell reports the
adjusted R2 value of the regression, as well as the number of instances consid-
ered in each case (which corresponds to the number of instances for which we
have data for each feature in the regression). It is important to note that since
different subsets of SAT formulas are used for each regression (since our dataset
is incomplete), we should not directly compare the cells in the top section of the
table. Nonetheless, the results do give some indication if each parameter relates
to solving time.
In order to show that combinations of these features can produce stronger
regression models, in the bottom half of Table 3, we consider all instances for
which we have LSR, treewidth, and community structure data. We exclude back-
bones and weak backdoors in this case, as it limits our study to SAT instances
and greatly reduces the number of datapoints. We considered all subsets of base
features of size 5 (e.g. V ⊕LSR/V ⊕LSR⊕Q⊕TW ), and report the best model
for each benchmark, according to adjusted R2 (i.e. the bolded data along the
diagonal). This results in notably stronger correlations than with any of the ho-
mogeneous features sets. Although we report our results with five base features
(whereas most homogeneous models only used four), similar results appear if we
only use four base features. We also note that R2 values results to be higher
for the Agile instances, as compared to application and crafted instances. This
is somewhat expected, as the set of instances are all derived from the SAGE
whitebox fuzzer [16], as compared to our other benchmarks which come from a
heterogeneous set of sources.
For each row corresponding to the heterogeneous feature sets, the base fea-
tures are ordered according to the confidence level (corresponding to p-values),
that the feature is significant to the regression (highest first), with respect to the
model used to produce the bold data along the diagonal (i.e. the best model for
each benchmark). Confidence values are measured as a percentage; for brevity,
we consider values over 99% as very significant, values between 99% and 95%
are significant, and values below 95% are insignificant. For application instances,
Q, C/V, and LSR/V are all very significant, Q/Cmtys was significant, and C
was not significant. For crafted instances, TW/V and Q were very significant,
but the other base features were insignficant. No features are significant for the
random track, indicating that the R2 value is likely spurious, partly due to the
small size of the benchmark. For the Agile benchmark, all five features are very
significant. In each model, several higher-order features are also reported as sig-
nificant, including several where the base feature is not considered significant.
We also remark that previous work showed notably higher R2 values for
community-based features [28]. There are several significant differences between
our experiments. First, our instances are pre-simplified before computing com-
munity structure. Their experiments grouped all Application, Crafted, and Ran-
dom into a single benchmark, whereas ours are split.
Structural Parameters for Industrial vs. Crafted Instances: The re-
search question we posed here is the following: Do real-world SAT instances have
significantly more favorable parameter values (e.g. smaller backdoors or higher
modularity), when compared to crafted or random instances? A positive result,
such that instances from application domains (including Agile) have better struc-
tural values, would support the hypothesis that such structure may relate to the
efficiency of CDCL solvers. Table 4 summarizes our results. We note that while
application and Agile instances indeed appear more structured with respect to
these parameters, the application benchmark has high standard deviation val-
ues. This could be due to the application instances coming from a wide variety
of sources.
4.1 Using Structural Parameters to Compare Solving Heuristics
When comparing different solvers or heuristics, the most common approach is to
run them on a benchmark to compare solving times, or in some cases the number
of conflicts during solving. However, such an approach does not lend much insight
as to why one heuristic is better than another, nor does it suggest any ways
in which a less performant heuristic may be improved. By contrast, in their
recent works Liang et al. [22,23], drew comparisons between various branching
heuristics by comparing their locality with respect to the community structure
or the “learning rate” of the solver. This eventually led them to build much
better branching heuristics. We hope to do the same by using LSR-backdoors as
a lens to compare restart policies.
Property Luby Always Restart Never Restart
LSR Size 0.16 (0.11) 0.13 (0.08) 0.25 (0.17)
Avg. Clause LSR 0.11 (0.08) 0.05 (0.05) 0.19 (0.14)
Num Conflicts 133246 (206441) 50470 (84606) 256046 (347899)
Solving Time (s) 8.59 (14.26) 6.09 (11.01) 18.09 (24.86)
Table 5. Comparison of LSR measures and solving time for various restart policies on
the Agile benchmark. LSR sizes are normalized by the number of variables.
Starting from the baseline MapleSAT solver, we consider three restart heuris-
tics: 1) the default heuristic based on the Luby sequence [24]; 2) restarting after
every conflict (always restart); and 3) never restarting. We test the following
properties of these heuristics, which may relate to their effect on solving perfor-
mance. First, we consider the LSR-backdoor size, as computed by the approach
discussed in Section 5. A run of the solver that focuses on fewer variables can be
seen as being more “local,” which may be favorable in terms of runtime. When
computing LSR-backdoor sizes, each learnt clause C is annotated with a set of
dependency variables (denoted D∗C in Section 5), which intuitively is a sufficient
set of variables such that a fresh solver, branching only on variables in this set,
can learn C. Our second measure looks at the average dependency set size for
each learnt clause.
Due to space limitations, we only consider the Agile instances as this gives
us a large benchmark where all instances are from the same domain. The data
in Table 5 corresponds to the average and standard deviation values across the
benchmark. We only consider instances where we can compute all data for each
heuristic, in total 2145 instances. The always restart policies emits smaller LSR
sizes, both overall and on average per clause, and, somewhat surprisingly, always
restarting outperforms the more standard Luby policy in this context. Note that
we do not expect this result to hold across all benchmarks, as it has been shown
that different restart policies are favorable for different types of instances [7].
However, given the success of always restarting here, results such as ours may
promote techniques to improve rapidly restarting solvers such as in [32].
5 Computing LSR-Backdoors
Dilkina et al. [11,13] incorporated clause learning into the concept of strong
backdoors by introducing LS-backdoors, and additionally described an approach
for empirically computing upper bounds on minimal LS-backdoors. We refer the
reader to our [anonymized] extended technical report for complete proofs [1].
We propose a new concept called learning-sensitive with restarts (LSR) back-
doors and an approach that takes advantage of allowing restarts which can often
greatly reduce the number of decisions necessary to construct such a backdoor
especially if many “unnecessary” clauses are derived during solving. Our key
insight is that, as stated in [5,29], most learnt clauses are ultimately not used to
determine SAT or UNSAT, and therefore we only need to consider variables re-
quired to derive such “useful” clauses. Our result shows that, for an unsatisfiable
formula, the set of variables within the set of learnt clauses in the UNSAT proof
constitutes an LSR-backdoor. The result for satisfiable formulas shows that the
set of decision variables in the final trail of the solver, along with the variables in
certain learnt clauses, constitute an LSR-backdoor. Before describing result, we
first recall the properties of absorption, 1-empowerment, and 1-provability, which
were initially used to demonstrate that CDCL can simulate general resolution
within some polynomial-size bound:
Definition 3 (Absorption [6]). Let ∆ be a set of clauses, let C be a non-
empty clause and let xα be a literal in C. Then ∆ absorbs C at xα if every
non-conflicting state of the solver that falsifies C \ {xα} assigns x to α. If ∆
absorbs C at every literal, then ∆ absorbs C.
The intuition behind absorbed clauses is that adding an already absorbed
clause C to ∆ is in some sense redundant, since any unit propagation that could
have been realized with C is already realized by clauses in ∆.
Definition 4 (1-Empowerment [30]). Let α⇒ l be a clause where l is some
literal in the clause and α is a conjunction of literals. The clause is 1-empowering
with respect to a set of clauses ∆ if:
1. ∆ |= (α⇒ l): the clause is implied by ∆.
2. ∆ ∧ α does not result in a conflict detectable by unit propagation.
3. ∆∧α 6⊢1 l: unit propagation cannot derive l after asserting the literals in α.
Definition 5 (1-Provability [31]). Given a set of clauses ∆, a clause C is
1-provable with respect to ∆ iff ∆ ∧ ¬C ⊢1 false.
An important note is that every learnt clause is both 1-empowering and 1-
provable, and therefore not absorbed, at the moment it is derived by a CDCL
solver (i.e., before being added to ∆) [30,31].
Lemma 1. Let ∆ be a set of clauses and suppose that C is a 1-empowering and
1-provable clause with respect to ∆. Then there exists a sequence σ of decisions
and restarts containing only variables from C such that ∆ and the set of learned
clauses obtained from applying σ absorbs C.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the construction of such a decision se-
quence in the proof of Proposition 2 of [31].
Our result additionally makes use of the following notation. Let F be a
formula and S be a CDCL solver. We denote the full set of learnt clauses
derived during solving as SL. For every conflicting state, let C
′ denote the
clause that will be learned through conflict analysis. We let RC′ be the set
of clauses on the conflict side of the implication graph used to derive C′ where
R∗C′ = RC′ ∪
⋃
C∈RC′
R∗C recursively defines the set of clauses needed to de-
rive C′ (where R∗original clause = ∅). For every learnt clause we define D
∗
C′ =
vars(C′) ∪
⋃
C∈R∗
C′
D∗C , where D
∗
original clause = ∅, as the set of variables in the
clause itself as well as any learnt clause used in the derivation of the clause (re-
cursively). Intuitively, D∗C′ is a sufficient set of dependency variables, such that
a fresh SAT solver can absorb C′ by only branching on variables in the set. For
a set of clauses ∆, we let R∗∆ =
⋃
C∈∆R
∗
C and D
∗
∆ =
⋃
C∈∆D
∗
C .
Lemma 2. Let S be a CDCL solver used to determine the satisfiability of some
formula F . Let ∆ ⊆ SL be a set of clauses learned while solving F . Then a fresh
solver S′ can absorb all clauses in ∆ by only branching on the variables in D∗∆.
Proof Sketch. Let seq(R∗∆) = 〈C1, C2, . . . Cn〉 be the sequence over R
∗
∆ in the
order that the original solver S derived the clauses, and suppose we have already
absorbed the first k − 1 clauses by only branching upon D∗{C1,...,Ck−1}. Then, in
particular, the clauses in RCk have been absorbed, so Ck must be 1-provable.
If Ck is not 1-empowering, then it is absorbed and we are done. If Ck is 1-
empowering, we can invoke Lemma 2 to absorb Ck by only branching on variables
in Ck, and vars(Ck) ⊆ D∗∆ by construction.
Theorem 1 (LSR Computation, SAT case). Let S be a CDCL solver, F
be a satisfiable formula, and T be the final trail of the solver immediately before
returning SAT, which is composed of a sequence of decision variables TD and
propagated variables TP . For each p ∈ TP , let the clause used to unit propagate
p be lp and the full set of such clauses be LP . Then B = TD ∪ D∗Lp constitutes
an LSR-backdoor for F .
Proof Sketch. Using Lemma 2, we first absorb all clauses in LP by branching
on D∗LP . We can then restart the solver to clear the trail, and branch on the
variables in TD, using the same order and polarity as the final trail of S. Since
we have absorbed each lp, every p will be propagated.
Theorem 2 (LSR Computation, UNSAT case). Let S be a CDCL solver,
F be an unsatisfiable formula, and ∆ ⊆ SL be the set of learnt clauses used to
derive the final conflict. Then D∗∆ constitutes an LSR-backdoor for F .
Proof. The result follows similarly to the satisfiable case. We learn all clauses
relevant to the proof using Lemma 2, which then allows unit propagation to
derive UNSAT.
We make some observations about our approach. First, our approach can
be easily lifted to any learning scheme other than the 1st-UIP scheme that is
currently the most widely used one. Second, the set of variables that constitute
an LSR-backdoor may be disjoint from the set of decisions made by the solver.
Third, the above approach depends on the ability to restart, and therefore can-
not be used to compute LS-backdoors. In particular, the construction of the
decision sequence for Lemma 1, as described in [31], requires restarting after
every conflict. As an additional remark of practical importance, modern CDCL
solvers often perform clause minimization to shrink a newly learnt clause before
adding it to the clause database [35], which can have a significant impact on per-
formance. Intuitively, this procedure reduces the clause by finding dependencies
among its literals. In order to allow clause minimization in our experiments, for
each clause C we include all clauses used by the minimizer in our set RC .
For our empirical results, we modified an off-the-shelf solver MapleSat [22],
by annotating each learnt clause C′ with D∗C′ . Note that we do not need to
explicitly record the set R∗C′ at any time. As in the LS-backdoor experiments
in [11], different LSR-backdoors can be obtained by randomizing the branching
heuristic and polarity selection. However, given the size and number of instances
considered here, we only perform one run per instance.
To ensure that our output is indeed an LSR-backdoor, we implemented a
verifier that works in three phases. First, we compute an LSR-backdoor B as
above. Second, we re-run the solver, and record every learnt clause C such that
D∗C ⊆ B. We then run a final solver with a modified branching heuristic, that
iterates through the sequence of learnt clauses from phase 2, absorbing each as
described in Lemma 2 (first checking that the clause is either absorbed or 1-
provable upon being reached in the sequence). We ensure that the solver is in a
final state by the end of the sequence.
6 Separating LS and LSR-Backdoors
In this section we prove that for certain kinds of formulas the minimal LSR-
backdoors are exponentially smaller than the minimal LS-backdoors under the
assumption that the learning scheme is 1st-UIP and that the CDCL solver is
only allowed to backtrack (and not backjump). In [12], the authors demonstrate
that LS-backdoors may be exponentially smaller than strong backdoors with
1st-UIP learning scheme but without restarts.
Let n be a positive integer and let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a set of Boolean
variables. For any Boolean variable x, let x1 denote the positive literal x and
x0 denote the negative literal ¬x. For any assignment α ∈ {0, 1}n let Cα =
x1−α11 ∨ x
1−α2
2 ∨ . . . ∨ x
1−αn
n denote the clause on x variables which is uniquely
falsified by the assignment α.
Our family of formulas will be defined using the following template. Let O
be any total ordering of {0, 1}n; we write <O to denote the relation induced by
this ordering. The formula is defined on the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn, and also
three auxiliary sets of variables {qα}α∈{0,1}n , {aα}α∈{0,1}n , {bα}α∈{0,1}n . Given
an ordering O we define the formula
FO =
∧
α∈{0,1}n
(Cα ∨
∨
α′≤Oα
¬qα′ ) ∧ (qα ∨ aα) ∧ (qα ∨ bα) ∧ (qα ∨ ¬aα ∨ ¬bα).
This family was introduced by Dilkina et al. [12], where the formula using the
lexicographic ordering provides an exponential separation between the sizes of
LS-backdoors and strong backdoors. Their key insight was that if a CDCL solver
without restarts queried the x1, . . . , xn variables in the lexicographic ordering
of assignments, it would learn crucial conflict clauses that would enable the
solver to establish the unsatisfiability of the instance without having to query
any additional variables. (By the term “querying a variable” we mean that the
solver assigns value to it and then performs any unit propagations.) Since strong
backdoors cannot benefit from clause learning they will necessarily have to query
additional variables to hit any conflict.
We show that the same family of formulas (but for a different ordering O)
can be used to separate LS-backdoor size from LSR-backdoor size. Observe that
for any ordering O the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn form an LSR-backdoor for FO.
Lemma 3. Let O be any ordering of {0, 1}n. The X-variables form an LSR-
backdoor for the formula FO.
Proof. For each assignment α ∈ {0, 1}n (ordered by O), assign α to the x vari-
ables by decision queries. By the structure of FO, as soon as we have a complete
assignment to the x variables, we will unit-propagate to a conflict and learn a qα
variable as a conflict clause; after that we restart. Once all of these assignments
are explored we will have learned the unit clause qα for every assignment α, and
so we can just query the X variables in any order (without restarts) to yield a
contradiction, since every assignment to the X variables will falsify the formula.
Note that the formula FO depends on N = O(2
n) variables, and so the size of
this LSR-backdoor is O(logN). Furthermore, observe that the X-variables will
also form an LS-backdoor if we can query the assignments α ∈ {0, 1}n according
to O without needing to restart — for example, ifO is the lexicographic ordering.
This suggests the following definition, which captures the orderings O of {0, 1}n
that can be explored by a CDCL algorithm without restarts:
Definition 6. Let TX be the collection of all depth-n decision trees on X-variables,
where we label each leaf ℓ of a tree T ∈ TX with the assignment α ∈ {0, 1}
n
ob-
tained by taking the assignments to the X-variables on the path from the root of
T to ℓ. For any T ∈ TX , let O(T ) be the ordering of {0, 1}
n
obtained by reading
the assignments labelling the leaves of T from left to right.
To get some intuition for our lower-bound argument, consider an ordering O(T )
for some decision tree T ∈ TX . By using the argument in Lemma 3 the formula
FO(T ) will have a small LS-backdoor, obtained by querying the X-variables ac-
cording to the decision tree T . Now, take any two assignments αi, αj ∈ O(T )
and let O(T )′ be the ordering obtained from O(T ) by swapping the indices of
αi and αj . If we try and execute the same CDCL algorithm without restarts
(corresponding to the ordering O(T )) on the new formula FO(T )′ , the algorithm
will reach an inconclusive state once it reaches the clause corresponding to αj
in O(T )′ since at that point the assignment to the X-variables will be αi. Thus,
it will have to query at least one more q variable (for instance, qαj ), which in-
creases the size of the backdoor by one. We can generalize the above argument
to multiple “swaps” — the CDCL algorithm without restarts querying the vari-
ables according to O(T ) would then have to query one extra variable for every
qα which is “out-of-order” with respect to O(T ).
This discussion leads us to the following complexity measure: for any ordering
O ∈ {0, 1}n (not necessarily obtained from a decision tree T ∈ TX) and any
ordering of the form O(T ), let
d(O,O(T )) = |
{
α′ ∈ {0, 1}n | ∃α ∈ {0, 1}n : α′ <O α, α <O(T ) α
′
}
|.
Informally, d(O,O(T )) counts the number of elements of O which are “out-of-
order” with respect to O(T ) as we have discussed above. We are able to show
that the above argument is fully general:
Lemma 4. Let O be any ordering of {0, 1}n, and let TX denote the collection of
all complete depth-n decision trees on X variables. Then any learning-sensitive
backdoor of FO has size at least
min
T∈TX
d(O,O(T )).
This reduces our problem to finding an ordering O for which every ordering
of the form O(T ) has many elements which are “out-of-order” with respect to
O (again, intuitively for every mis-ordered element in the LS-backdoor we will
have to query at least one more q-variable.)
Lemma 5. For any n > 4 there exists an ordering O of {0, 1}n such that for
every decision tree T ∈ TX we have
d(O,O(T )) ≥ 2n−2.
Proof Sketch. We define the ordering, and leave the full proof of correctness
to the companion technical report [1]. Let β1, β2, . . . , βN be the lexicographic
ordering of {0, 1}n, and for any string βi define βi to be the string obtained by
flipping each bit in βi. Then let O be the ordering
β1, β1, β2, β2, . . . , βN/2, βN/2.
Theorem 3. For every n > 3, there is a formula Fn on N = O(2
n) vari-
ables such that the minimal LSR-backdoor has O(logN) variables, but every
LS-backdoor has Ω(N) variables.
7 Future Work and Conclusions
We presented a large-scale study of several structural parameters of SAT in-
stances. We showed that combinations of these features can lead to improved
regression models, and that in general, industrial instances tend to have much
more favorable parameter values than crafted or random. Further, we gave ex-
amples of how such parameters may be used as a “lens” to evaluate different
solver heuristics. We hope these studies can be used by complexity theorists as a
guide for which parameters to focus on in future analyses of CDCL. Finally, we
introduced LSR-backdoors, which characterize a sufficient subset of the variables
that CDCL can branch on to solve the formula. In doing so, we presented an algo-
rithm to compute LSR-backdoors that exploits the notion of clause absorption,
and further showed that certain formulas have exponentially smaller minimal
LSR-backdoors than LS-backdoors under the assumption that the CDCL solver
only backtracks (not backjumps) and uses the 1st-UIP learning scheme. From a
theoretical point of view, it remains open whether there is a separation between
LS and LSR-backdoors when backjumping is allowed. On the empirical side, we
plan to investigate approaches to computing many small LSR-backdoors to for-
mulas. The intuition is that CDCL solvers may be more efficient on Application
instances because they have lots of LSR-backdoors and the solver may “latch”
on to a backdoor relatively easily, while these solvers are less efficient for crafted
instances because they have too few backdoors. Further, we plan to refine our
results by analyzing individual sub-categories of the benchmarks studied, with
a particular focus on scaling to crafted instances.
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A LSR Notation Example
d1
d2
d3
d4
l1
l2
l3
C′
l4
l5
⊥
L1
L2
L3
L4
L5
C′ = (¬l1 ∨ ¬l2 ∨ ¬l3)
R∗L3 = {L6, L7}
R∗L4 = {}
R∗L5 = {L6}
RC′ = {L3, L4, L5}
R∗C′ = {L3, L4, L5, L6, L7}
D∗C′ = {var(l1), var(l2), var(l3)}∪
vars({L3, L4, L5, L6, L7})
Fig. 1. Example conflict analysis graph depicting the set of relevant clauses and vari-
ables to some learnt clause C′. Nodes are literals. Edges labeled with some Li are
previously learnt clauses; all other edges depicting propagations are from the original
formula F . The clauses L6, L7 used to derive L3 and L5 are not shown, but would be
in the respective conflict analysis graphs of L3 and L5. The clauses L1 and L2 are not
included in RC′ since they occur on the reason side of the graph.
B Full Proofs on Computing LSR-Backdoors
In this appendix, we present the proofs for Lemma 2 and Theorem 1. We define
the following notation. We let F be a formula, overloaded to also denote its
set of clauses. Let ∆ be a set of clauses and C be some clause we would like
to absorb. We define the function absorb(∆,C) → ∆2, which produces a new
clause set ∆2, such that ∆ ⊆ ∆2 and ∆2 absorbs C by applying Lemma 1. If C is
already absorbed by ∆, then absorb(∆,C) = ∆, and if C is not 1-provable with
respect to ∆, then absorb(∆,C) = fail. We overload absorb to take a sequence
of clauses, such that absorb(∆, 〈C1, C2, . . . , Cn〉) = ∆n, which applies absorb to
the clauses in order, and for each intermediate ∆i produced, it absorbs every
clause Cj , j ≤ i. Again, if any clause Ci is not 1-provable with respect to ∆i−1,
then absorb returns fail.
Lemma 2 Let S be a CDCL solver used to determine the satisfiability of some
formula F . Let ∆ ⊆ SL be a set of clauses learned during solving. Then a fresh
solver S′ can absorb all clauses in ∆ by only branching on the variables in D∗∆.
Proof. We show that S′ can absorb all clauses in R∗∆, which includes ∆. Let
seq(R∗∆) = 〈C1, C2, . . . Cn〉 be the sequence overR
∗
∆ in the order that the original
solver S derived the clauses. Consider the first clause C1. By construction, it does
not depend upon any learnt clauses (i.e. it was derived from only original clauses),
and since S learned C1, it must be 1-empowering and 1-provable with respect
to the initial clause set. By Lemma 1, we can absorb C1 by only branching on
variables in C1, which again by construction are in D
∗
∆. We therefore have that
absorb(F,C1) = Θ1 absorbs C1.
Suppose absorb(F, 〈C1, C2, . . . Ck−1〉) = Θk−1 absorbs the first k − 1 clauses
by only branching on the variables in C1, C2, . . . Ck−1, and we wish to absorb
Ck. There are two cases to consider. First, Ck may already be absorbed by
Θk−1, since the clauses learnt by absorb(. . .) may absorb clauses in addition to
C1, . . . , Ck−1, in which case we are done. So suppose Ck is not absorbed by Θk−1.
Since every previous clause in seq(R∗∆) has been absorbed, we in particular have
that the clauses in RCk have been absorbed, so Ck must be 1-provable. To see
this, suppose instead of absorbing RCk we learned the exact set of clauses in
RCk . Then by construction, negating all literals in Ck must lead to a conflict
through unit propagation. Since we have instead absorbed RCk , any propagation
that was used to derive the conflict must also be possible using the clauses that
absorb RCk (by definition of absorption).
We also know that Ck is 1-empowering with respect ot Θk−1, since otherwise
it is absorbed by definition, and we assumed this is not true. Therefore, we can
invoke Lemma 1, such that absorb(Θk−1, Ck) = Θk, which is derived by only
branching on the variables in Ck. Again, vars(Ck) ⊆ D∗∆ by construction.
Theorem 1 (LSR Computation, SAT case) Let S be a CDCL solver, F be
a satisfiable formula, and T be the final trail of the solver immediately before
returning SAT, which is composed of a sequence of decision variables TD and
propagated variables TP . For each p ∈ TP , let the clause used to unit propagate
p be lp and the full set of such clauses be LP . Then B = TD ∪ D∗Lp constitutes
an LSR-backdoor for F .
Proof. Using Lemma 2, we first absorb all clauses in LP by branching on D
∗
LP
.
We can then restart the solver to clear the trail, and branch on the variables
in TD, using the same order and polarity as the final trail of S. If any d ∈ TD
is already assigned due to learnt clauses used to absorb LP , unit propagation
will be able derive the literals propagated by d, since we have absorbed ld. Note
that with this final branching scheme, we can not reach a state where the wrong
polarity of a variable in TD becomes implied through propagation (i.e. with
respect to the final trail polarities), since the solver is sound and this would
block the model found by the original solver S.
C Proof Separating LS and LSR-Backdoors
Here we present the full proofs for Section 6.
Let n be a positive integer and let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a set of boolean
variables. For any boolean variable x, let x1 denote the positive literal x and
x0 denote the negative literal ¬x. For any assignment α ∈ {0, 1}n let Cα =
x1−α11 ∨ x
1−α2
2 ∨ . . . ∨ x
1−αn
n denote the clause on x variables which is uniquely
falsified by the assignment α. Throughout we implicitly assume that the clause
learning algorithm is 1st-UIP.
Our formula will be defined by the following template. Let O be an ordering
of {0, 1}n; we write <O to denote the relation induced by this ordering. Given
an ordering O we can define the formula
FO =
∧
α∈{0,1}n
(Cα ∨
∨
α′≤Oα
¬qα′ ) ∧ (qα ∨ aα) ∧ (qα ∨ bα) ∧ (qα ∨ ¬aα ∨ ¬bα).
Lemma 3 Let O be any ordering of {0, 1}n. The X-variables form a learning-
sensitive backdoor with restarts for the formula FO.
Proof. Query the x variables according to the ordering given by O. As soon as
we have a complete assignment to the x variables, we will unit-propagate to a
conflict and learn a qα variable as a conflict clause; after that we restart. Once
all such assignments are explored we can simply query the X variables in any
order (without restarts) to yield a contradiction, since every assignment to the
X variables will falsify the formula.
Consider any decision tree T of depth n where we have queried the X vari-
ables in any order in the tree T . From this tree we obtain a natural ordering
O(T ) of {0, 1}n by reading off the strings labelling the leaves in left-to-right
order. Note that the orderings of the form O(T ) are exactly the orderings which
can be generated by DPLL algorithms (or, more generally, a CDCL algorithm
without restarts). For any such complete decision tree T and any ordering O of
{0, 1}n, define
d(O,O(T )) = |
{
α′ ∈ {0, 1}n | ∃α ∈ {0, 1}n : α′ <O α, α <O(T ) α
′
}
|.
That is, d(O,O(T )) is the number of strings α′ which are “out of order” in O(T )
with respect to O.
Lemma 4 Let O be any ordering of {0, 1}n, and let TX denote the collection of
all complete depth-n decision trees on X variables. Then any learning-sensitive
backdoor of FO has size at least
min
T∈TX
d(O,O(T )).
Proof. LetB be a minimal learning-sensitive backdoor of FO. LetQ = {qα}α∈{0,1}n .
First we show that without loss of generality the following holds:
1. B ⊆ X ∪Q.
2. All queries to Q-variables occur before any query to an X-variable.
We begin with an observation: any query to a variable qα can be assumed to be
of the form qα = F . To see this, notice that querying qα = F will immediately
unit propagate to a conflict, and 1UIP-learning will immediately yield the unit
clause qα. Thus we can always replace queries of the form qα = T in-situ with
queries qα = F without affecting the rest of the algorithm’s execution.
Let us first show that B ⊆ X ∪ Q. Suppose that there is a variable aα ∈ B
(the case where bα ∈ B is symmetric). We show that aα can be replaced with qα.
Consider the first time that aα is queried as a decision variable. By the structure
of FO, we can assume that qα has not been assigned before querying aα as a
decision variable (as we have shown above, if this is the case then qα = T ,
which eliminates the two clauses containing aα). If aα = F , then qα = T is
unit-propagated, and all clauses containing aα or bα will be removed. It follows
that any conflict following this assignment must occur in a clause containing
Cα′ for some α
′, and thus replacing aα with qα will not affect the queries to the
backdoor in this case. So, instead, suppose that aα = T . Clearly, in order for
this assignment to have been necessary, the variable qα must be assigned after
assigning aα (either by unit propagation or a decision). Observe that if qα is set
to true after assigning aα = T , then the two clauses containing aα are removed
and so assigning qα = T to begin with would not have affected the execution of
the algorithm on the backdoor. Similarly, setting qα = F will unit propagate to
a conflict in this case and we would learn the unit clause qα = T as above, again
showing that we could have replaced aα with qα without affecting the backdoor.
Thus aα can be replaced with qα without loss of generality.
Next we show that all decision queries to Q-variables can be made before
queries toX-variables without loss of generality. As argued above, we can assume
that when qα is queried as a decision variable it is queried negatively (as this will
lead immediately to learning the unit clause qα). Consider any conflict which
occurs in the process of querying the variables of the backdoor that does not
happen because of querying ¬qα. Since B ⊆ X ∪ Q, by the structure of FO
any such conflict must occur after assigning all X-variables to some string α ∈
{0, 1}n. Corresponding to this total assignment α to theX-variables is the unique
clause Cα which is falsified by this assignment, so consider the clause in FO of
the form
Cα ∨
∨
α′≤Oα
¬qα′ .
After assigning a subset of the Q-variables of B and assigning all X-variables to
α a conflict can occur in two ways:
1. qα′ = 1 for all α
′ ≤O α and the clause above is the conflict clause, or
2. there exists a single qα∗ which is unassigned after assigning all of these
variables; the above clause leads to assigning qα∗ = F and thus learning the
unit clause qα∗ , as argued above.
In either case, moving all qα queries to the beginning of the algorithm will not
affect these conflicts: this is clear in case (1); in case (2) the only possibility is
that qα∗ was queried at the beginning and so the conflict will change to a case
(1) conflict.
We are now ready to finish the proof of the lemma. We encode the execution
of the CDCL algorithm as a decision tree, wherein we first query all Q-variables
and then query all X-variables. Note that we must assign all X-variables to hit
a conflict by the structure of FO, and so we let T denote the complete depth-n
decision tree querying the X-variables obtained from the CDCL execution tree.
Recalling that B ⊆ X ∪Q, to prove the lemma it suffices to prove that
|B ∩Q| ≥ d(O,O(T )).
Since B is a backdoor, it must be that at every leaf of the tree T the unit
propagator will propagate the input to a conflict. Consider the ordering of the
assignments O(T ) induced by this tree T . At each leaf of this tree, which corre-
sponds to an assignment α to the X variables, consider the clause
Cα ∨
∨
α′≤Oα
¬qα′ .
There are two possibilities: either we learn a unit clause qα∗ for some α
∗ ≤O α
or we do not. If we have not then we must have already learned the unit clauses
qα′ for all α
′ ≤O α. Otherwise, we must have learned the unit clauses qα′ for
each α′ ≤O α satisfying α′ 6= α∗. This implies that
B ∩Q ⊇
⋃
α∈{0,1}n
{
α′ | α′ >O(T ) α, α
′ ≤O α
}
,
as for each α ∈ {0, 1}n we must query, at least, all variables α′ which occur after
α in O(T ) but before α in O. This proves the lemma.
By the previous lemma, to lower bound the size of the learning sensitive
backdoor it suffices to find an ordering O of {0, 1}n for which any ordering O(T )
produced by a decision tree has many “inversions” with respect to O.
Lemma 5 There exists an ordering O of {0, 1}n such that for every decision
tree T ∈ TX we have
d(O,O(T )) ≥ 2n−2.
Proof. Let T ∈ TX be any decision tree. Let N = 2n and write O(T ) =
α1, α1, . . . , αN . We use the following key property of orderings generated from
decision trees:
Key Property. For any decision tree T there is a coordinate i ∈ [n] and b ∈
{0, 1} such that
αj [i] = b, αk[i] = 1− b
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , N/2 and k = N/2 + 1, N/2 + 2, . . . , N .
This property is easy to prove: simply let i be the index of the variable labelled
on the root of the decision tree T . If the decision tree queries the bit b in the
left subtree then the first half of the strings in the ordering will have the ith bit
of the string set to b, and the second half of strings set to 1− b.
To use this property, let β1, β2, . . . , βN be the lexicographic ordering of {0, 1}
n,
and for any string βi define βi to be the string obtained by flipping each bit in
βi. Then let O be the ordering
β1, β1, β2, β2, . . . , βN/2, βN/2.
It follows that for each i ∈ [n] and each b ∈ {0, 1}, half of the strings α ∈ {0, 1}n
with α[i] = b will be in the first half of the ordering O and half of the strings
with α[i] = b are in the second half of the ordering O. The lemma follows by
applying the Key Property.
Corollary 1. There exists an ordering O such that any learning-sensitive back-
door for the formula FO has size at least 2n−2.
Theorem 3 For every n > 3, there is a formula Fn on N = O(2
n) vari-
ables such that the minimal LSR-backdoor has O(logN) variables, but every
LS-backdoor has Ω(N) variables.
